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WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! By Fred Rodell. New York: Reynal and
Hitchcock, 1939. Pp. xi, 274. $2.50.
Boys, the jig is up.*
Fred Rodell, Yale Professor and a fugitive from the practice of law,'
has just written an expose of the legal profession. For the first time, one
has dared to rip the mask from that bastard child of justice defiled-The
Law. At last the common man can know the truth. The fraud is shown,
the hoax punctured. Take Mr. Rodell's word for it, the detonation is
terrific.
Says Mr. Rodell, The Law is a racket 2 by which lawyers contrive to
control and muddle our lives, a racket perpetuated by a wholly dishonest
and meaningless mumbo-jumbo practiced as a phoney art by lawyer-priests
to confuse the public while it is being milked for fees. He concludes that
The Law should be dumped overboard, together with the lawyers (that
goes for judges, too) in anticipation of a layman's era of Justice and
Common Sense. Do I overstate the matter? You underestimate Mr. Rodell.
The evidence Mr. R accumulates is pretty good evidence of something or
other, but our impetuous friend likes to rush for home plate without touch-
ing second or third. In the most impudent Time style (in Mr. R's hands,
frequently witty but rarely good-humored) he regales his lay audience with
set-up examples of legal atrocities, smashing his point home with the
startling admission that The Law is comprised wholly of such stuff. Un-
fortunately, Mr. R does his target practice with a shotgun, his surgery with
a pick and shovel. That his patient should die as a result is no sorrow to
Dr. Rodell; he would rather like to officiate at the funeral.3
As a critic of particular legalisms, the author does a fair enough job of
presenting a number of warmed-over realistic criticisms of The Law. So
far, so good; that is, if we overlook some very sorry and historically in-
accurate remarks about the doctrine of Consideration, including a tendency
to get away from vivisection into the grave-snatching of legal cadavers like
seals4 or the doctrine that charitable subscription cases rest only on the
theory that subscribers furnish their own consideration through a little
mutual boot-strap pulling. These, of course, are trivial matters, for Mr. R.
cares very little for The Law.
Since Mr. R displays a marked propensity for confusing assertion with
proof, it may be useful to extract the wheat from the Rodell. Salvaging,
we learn: some legal terms mean nothing to a layman (7, 8) ;, others mean
* Forgive me, dear reader, if I cannot avoid the contagion of Mr. R's
attitude and style.
1. Don't think for a moment that Mr. R ever practiced law. It would
challenge his dearest boast (p. x).
2. Introducing: the Rodellian concept of the (probably) innocent
"racket" (p. 16).
3. One fears the rites may well be Mr. R's.
4. Dead in most states, anyway.
5. References are to pages.
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different things to laymen from what they do to lawyers (8); lawyers do
not work for nothing (16, 233); the law is uncertain, though judges
(i. e., lawyers) sometimes pretend otherwise (19); the law is conservative
(23, 37); the law draws arbitrary lines (47); judges sometimes change
their minds (18, 19); judges sometimes disagree (97); judges frequently
pretend that they are "bound" by precedent while making laws which they
pretend to have "found" (24, 33, 37); judges often construe statutes in
violation of their literal meanings (25-28); judges are affected in their
decisions by extra-legal considerations (12); in legal opinions "reasons"
are frequently only rationalizations, names for the result (55, 166). In
brief, "judges are men, not gods" (265).
Although most of this is neither news nor very wicked, Mr. R has in
some instances put a finger on serious ills. Few will quarrel (not even all
the lawyers) with his attack on The Law's tendency to do what medicine,
falconry, and all worthwhile human activity ever does: seek pseudo im-
pressiveness through a private, and largely unintelligible, language. He
also has Hypocrisy by the tail when he derides the judiciary for deciding
cases as if precedent compelled their every move. Surely, the extension of
candor to conceding that the court's job involves necessary and desirable
judicial legislation would avoid much of the fictionizing which at best
represents only an attempt to pay lip service to rules which are being
amended.
Instead of resting content with twice-told tales, Mr. R goes on to gener-
alize so extravagantly6 and to flaunt a navvet6 so incredible7 that one
wonders whether he really uses his words for their accuracy rather than
their power to incite. Either he calculates only effects on a super-gullible
laity or he has achieved an embarrassing revelation of his own fundamental
confusions, a most unhappy demonstration that knowledge is not wisdom
nor cleverness a substitute for a philosophy.
So long as he is hacking up specific legalisms, Mr. R is in fine fettle,
but concerning the world at large he has just pierced his chrysalis. Cur-
rently, he is lost in the jungles of Semantica, where he flounders under the
soul-shattering realization that after all words are just words and abstrac-
tions just abstractions. The shock has been a little too much.8 More
6. Take your pick: "Every lawyer is about the same as every other
lawyer" (6) ; "the lawyer's trade is built entirely on words" (9) ; "you can
look through every bit of The Law * * * without finding a single rule that
makes as much sense as 'anyone who spits on this platform will be fined
five dollars'" (12); "the alleged logic * * * of almost any Supreme Court
case you could name * * * [is] nothing more nor less than an intellectual
fraud" (130) ; "Every * * * so-called concept or principle of The Law * * *
amounts to a vague legal way of stating a result, applied to the result
after the result is reached" (55).
7. E. g., "Most business transactions *** run off smoothly of their own
accord. * * * If they [lawyers] would let men carry on their affairs and
make their agreements in simple specific terms and in words intelligible to
those involved, there would be fewer misunderstandings and fewer real or
imagined causes for grievance" (177). Or am I wrong, and is Mr. R only
stacking the cards? See also later.
8. "Legal words and concepts and principles float in a purgatory of their
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sophisticated critics take solace in the knowledge that, although the tags of
those man-made concepts and abstractions which make thinking possible
are not always labelled in terms of the human ends which justify their
creation, it does not follow that such concepts bear no ultimate relation
to those ends.
The conscientious critic thinks also of remedies. And so, where lawyers
built of clay, Mr. R rebuilds with cardboard. It is in the concluding chap-
ters that the author displays his true stature.
Since legal words, rules, and concepts are wholly absurd ("justice can't
be cut up into convenient categories"), "the sensible thing to do would seem
to be to go after justice" itself,9 as "clarified" somewhat by written laws
(252). "Statutes would all have to be redrafted * * * [by] a chosen group
of non-lawyers" (255). Thus, for example, a statute providing that "First
degree murder is punishable by death" would read "When a court * * *
finds that one person has killed another person and believes that the killer
deserves to be electrocuted, the court may order that he be electrocuted"
(257).
In Rodell's Revolutionary Regime, judges would be replaced by "decision-
makers," persons "trained in the technicalities of factual problems, rather
than in the technicalities of legal language" (258). "So each state would
have, say, a Killing Commission to apply its laws about what are now called
murder and manslaughter" (263). In short, the judicial function is to be
taken over by administrative agencies (266) from whose decisions no
appeal would lie to "other bodies of men who knew and understood less
about the real matter in dispute than the original deciders" (264). Where
a dispute involved more than one specialized problem, a sort of progressive
dinner party is suggested (261-2).
What happens when "experts" disagree, who is to conduct and coordinate
the dinner party during its various courses, what happens to "common
sense" in Justice by Specialists, how cases are to be decided without the
use of rules and abstractions, Mr. R does not say. "It is not an easy, nor a
quick solution. It would take time and foresight and planning" (249). But
the system would be operated somehow by "men trained and qualified in
the efficient and wise administration of government affairs" (263). Nice
work, Fred.
In court, litigants obviously need no lawyer to mouth their lies (269).
Nor does the office lawyer's advice have any particular efficacy, except to
create trouble (177). "Why should not a man who wants to leave property
to his wife at his death say in his will, 'I want everything I own to go to
my wife when I die,' instead of having to hire a lawyer?" (270). 0. K.,
Mr. R, but you say very little about the man who wants to include Uncle
Wiggly and some others as well and who in general prefers to distribute his
largesse in more complicated fashions. Perhaps, however, that is an unfair
own, halfway between the heaven of abstract ideals and the hell of plain
facts and completely out of touch with both of them" (201).
9. -?
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question and should be reserved for "men trained and skilled in coping with
practical human affairs" (273).
But time grows late and even now a disillusioned public gathers at the
office door. Sneak out the back way, boys, and will someone please warn
the lawyers at Yale that amongst them is a layman boring from within.
Ruu DicmsoN.t
LAw AND POLITIcs. Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 1913-1938.
Edited by Archibald MacLeish and E. F. Prichard, Jr. New York: Har-
court, Brace & Co., 1938. Pp. 352. $3.00.
In 1936 Professor Frankfurter, Harvard Law '06, wrote: "More and
more, the ablest of [the young]-in striking contrast to what was true
thirty years ago-are eager for service in government."' In this revolu-
tionary trend, the young law officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs was
thirty years ahead of the market which, as Byrne Professor of Adminis-
trative Law at Harvard, he helped later to supply. No doubt, he never
consciously sized up the marketability of the various careers available to
him and to his students. Rather his sense for latent issues-which Mr.
MacLeish, in a fine foreword, terms his journalistic gift-spotted the ex-
ceptional importance in American life of "that eternal and world-wide
affinity between politics and law.' 2 His life-long attention to "public law"
is striking on two counts. First, such concentration of aim would seem to
run counter to his boundless curiosity and humanistic cultivation, traits
revealed only by an occasional distant reference in his writing. (Professor
W. P. M. Kennedy has implied that politics and law are of transcendent
importance in Canada because its culture is thin and derivative; 3 may not
the same have been true of us, to some extent, during Professor Frank-
furter's formative years?) In the second place, his constant focus on
crucial, topical questions does not gibe with his insistence that research
should be disinterested, almost idly curious inquiry, remote from social
objectives.4 Although Professor Frankfurter, like every decent scholar, did
his best to be objective once he had set his problem, I am sure It was not
mere chance that made him ask related and socially significant questions
in administrative law and criminal law administration, in social legislation,
and in the role of the Supreme Court in enforcing the constitutional divi-
sions of power.
The essays in this volume, skillfully chosen to avoid repetition, and care-
fully edited to avoid technicalities and footnotes, give glimpses of his work
in all these fields except for criminal law, which is represented only indi-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. P. 249, The Young Men Go to Washington.
2. Stout, Public Service in Great Britain (1938) 62.
3. Some Aspects of the Theories and Workings of Constitutional Law
(1931) 99.
4. P. 287 et seq., The Conditions for, and Aims and Methods of, Legal
Research.
19401
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol25/iss2/5
